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Abstract
In this paper, I review recent trends in global integration of ﬁnancial systems and
assess the implications for international macroeconomic adjustment. While recent
growth in the scale of international balance sheets has been dramatic, product markets
remain quite segmented. The mis-match between ﬁnancial and real integration means
that the role of exchange rates in international adjustment has taken on an even more
crucial role.
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Much of the research cited in this paper is based on ongoing collaboration with Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti
of the International Monetary Fund.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A deﬁning feature of recent international economic history has been the tremendous growth
in cross-border ﬁnancial trade. The “international balance sheets” of countries now look
quite diﬀerent relative to the situation in earlier periods, with the accumulation of large
gross cross-holdings of foreign assets and foreign liabilities across a broad spectrum of
investment categories. In this paper, I discuss the drivers of international ﬁnancial inte-
gration and ask whether all barriers to asset trade have been eliminated. I next consider
the macroeconomic implications of these trends. Finally, I analyse the interaction between
ﬁnancial globalisation and real globalisation, where the latter refers to the international
integration of product markets.
2 Measuring International Financial Integration
There a number of diﬀerent options in measuring the extent of ﬁnancial globalisation.
O n ep o p u l a rm e t h o dh a sb e e nt om e a s u r es h i f t so v e rt i m ei nt h et h ep r e v a l e n c eo fc a p i t a l
controls (see Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti 1995 for an inﬂuential contribution). However, that
approach does not indicate the extent to which cross-border asset trade actually takes
place once legal prohibitions on international capital mobility are removed. Another route
is to focus on price-based measures of integration: does arbitrage ensure that the prices of
similar assets are equalised across locations? While useful, this route also does not reveal
the extent of asset trade that occurs once barriers to arbitrage have been eliminated.
Rather, my research with Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti has focused on tracking volume-
based measures of international ﬁnancial integration. The volume of international asset
holdings plays a central role in international macroeconomic models, since the scale of
international balance sheets largely determines the scope for risk sharing and inﬂuences the
international transmission of ﬁnancial shocks. Until recently, a problem in pursuing volume-
based measures has been a lack of data on the value of international investment positions.
While much was known about international capital ﬂows, the dynamics of investment
2holdings also heavily depend on revaluation eﬀects: for instance, a large capital loss on a
given foreign asset holding may vastly outweigh new ﬂows in that asset class.
The situation has improved markedly in recent years: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a)
employed a variety of valuation techniques to assemble data on stocks of foreign assets
and liabilities for 67 countries over 1970-1997, while there has also been a greater eﬀort to
improve the oﬃcial statistics on international investment positions. (However, the latter
typically only covers the most recent years, rather than providing a long time series of
data.) Moreover, in addition to measuring the aggregate positions, the work of Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2001b) has also highlighted the importance of the composition of
the international balance sheet. For instance, the potential for international risk sharing is
sensitive to the debt-equity mix in terms of the external capital structure of nations.
These new data sources highlight that there has been a trend increase in international
ﬁnancial integration since the early 1980s.1 An important feature of the data is that this
trend has accelerated since the mid-1990s: the pace of ﬁnancial globalization has increased
over the last decade. For a group of industrial countries over 1983-2001, Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2003) seek to identify the drivers of international ﬁnancial integration by running
a panel regression of the form
∆IFIGDPit = αi + γ ∗ Xit + β ∗ ∆Zit + εit (1)
where IFIGDPit is the ratio of the sum of gross foreign assets and gross foreign liabilities
to GDP and Xit,Z it are a set of country- and time-varying determinants.2 Their results
highlight that domestic and international ﬁnancial deepening are highly complementary:
a key driver of international asset trade has been the growth in domestic stockmarket
capitalizations. In addition, growth in GDP per capita and the volume of product trade
have also been associated with a faster pace of ﬁnancial globalization. The latter result also
underlines the tight connection between real and ﬁnancial dimensions of global integration:
1See also Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) for a longer-term perspective.
2Baele et al (2004) provide much interesting material on the regional dimension to international ﬁnancial
integration, focusing on the impressive degree of market consolidation among euro area countries. See also
Spiegel (2004) for a case study of Portugal.
3we return to this point later in this paper. In summary, those industrial countries that are
enjoying domestic ﬁnancial deepening, faster output growth and expansion of international
trade in goods and services are also those that are furthest ahead in terms of ﬁnancial
globalization.
With respect to the emerging market group of developing countries, ﬁnancial globaliza-
tion has also been taking place, albeit with some major ﬂuctuations associated with the
various crises of the 1990s.3 As is shown by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004a), a noteworthy
feature of recent years has been that the emerging market economies are accumulating
signiﬁcant stocks of foreign assets. While a large proportion of this can be attributed to
increases in oﬃcial external reserves, other asset categories such as FDI and portfolio equity
are also expanding for a number of these countries.
The recent increases in ﬁnancial globalization have been impressive. Moreover, many
of the driving factors point to further growth in the coming years, since developments
such as capital account liberalization, deregulation of domestic ﬁnancial systems, domestic
ﬁnancial deepening, growth in international product trade all look to be ongoing processes
that are largely irreversible.
However, it is important to realize that we are still far from the notional end point of
a uniﬁed global capital market. The prevalence of home bias in investment and portfolio
decisions is well known, even if it may be getting weaker. Moreover, even when investors
do go overseas, the pattern of international investment is far from the benchmark predic-
tion that the representative investor should hold the ‘world market’ portfolio, with each
destination country represented in proportion to its share in global capitalization. Exploit-
ing a new large-scale IMF-coordinated survey of international portfolio holdings, Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2004b) study the determinants of bilateral equity holdings. Their regression
3Kose et al. (2003) show that the net gains to ﬁnancial globalization have been typically lower for
these countries compared to the advanced industrial nations. This in part can be attributed to the impact
of the 1990s crises but also highlights the importance of high-quality domestic institutions and policies
in maximising the gains from liberalization. For lower-income developing countries, ﬁnancial ﬂows are
dominated by oﬃcial lending, with a much more limited role for private capital.
4speciﬁcation is
log(EQHS)=αH + αS + βXHS + εHS (2)
where EQHS is the equity holdings by source country S in host country H, αH is a host-
country ﬁxed eﬀect, αS is a source-country ﬁxed eﬀect and XHS is a set of bilateral variables
that may inﬂuence portfolio allocations. It is important to include the ﬁxed eﬀect dummies
for the source and host countries: otherwise, a high level of equity holdings by country S in
country H may simply reﬂect that the source country invests heavily in all locations and/or
the host country is a major recipient of international investment from all sources. In this
setting, the bilateral variables XHS are included in order to explain why source country S
may under- or over-weight host country H relative to other countries.
Their study highlights an important complementarity between trade integration and
ﬁnancial integration: a robust covariate of bilateral portfolio holdings is the bilateral volume
of trade. In addition, informational proxies such as a common language and distance also
turn out to be typically signiﬁcant in explaining the bilateral variation in holdings. Holding
ﬁxed these variables, ‘ﬁnancial’ factors such as the correlation in returns between markets
do not appear to be signiﬁcant. These results indicate that the theoretical simpliﬁcation
of a homogeneous global investor is quite misleading: investment patterns remain quite
fragmented, in line with the presence of trade and informational frictions.4
3 Financial Globalization and Macroeconomic Adjust-
ment
In the previous section, we focused on the growth in gross holdings of cross-border in-
vestments. However, by promoting risk diversiﬁcation, ﬁnancial globalization may also be
associated with an increase in the dispersion of net foreign asset positions, with some coun-
tries emerging as long-term creditors and others long-term debtors. For many countries, net
4Portes and Rey (2004) show that such frictions are also important in explaining bilateral turnover
volumes in equity markets.
5international investment positions remain quite small but there are important exceptions,
with the most notable case being the emergence of the US as the world’s largest net issuer
of external liabilities.5 On the other side, countries such as Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore
and Switzerland have very positive net foreign asset positions.
The facilitation of non-zero long-term net foreign asset positions is one of the puta-
tive gains from international ﬁnancial integration. Countries that wish to generate future
investment income may naturally run current account surpluses, while countries that pre-
fer current to future expenditure are enabled to run current account deﬁcits. In addition
to standard cyclical ﬂuctuations, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a) show that the dynam-
ics of net foreign asset positions can be fairly well explained by a parsimonious model in
which the driving variables are relative output per capita, net public debt and demographic
structures. According to their estimates, countries that are have lower output per capita,
larger government debts and youth-biased demography are more likely to be long-term net
debtors, while richer countries with lower public debt and an older population emerge as
the corresponding group of net creditors.
However, increased dispersion in net foreign asset positions has implications for macro-
economic stability and external adjustment. Even if large net positions are perfectly sus-
tainable, the lack of perfect integration in product markets means that the distribution
of trade imbalances that is implied by a world of long-term creditors and debtors requires
substantial movements in real exchange rates. As is shown by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2002a, 2004), the magnitude of this transfer eﬀect is quite sizeable and varies with degree
of trade integration: the scale of the real exchange rate adjustment that is required to shift
the trade balance of large, domestically-orientated country is much greater than for a small,
highly-open economy. One implication is that the scale of exchange rate adjustment that
is required in response to larger net international investment positions will depend on the
extent and nature of real globalization in addition to the evolution of ﬁnancial globalization.
This begs the question of the inter-relation between the diﬀerent dimensions of economic
5See also Greenspan (2004) and Summers (2004). At a regional level, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002)
show that there is increasing dispersion of current account balance among eurozone member countries.
6globalization. As is emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), a generalized reduction in
trade costs will also promote ﬁnancial globalization, since the gains to international portfo-
lio diversiﬁcation are enhanced by greater trade integration.6 However, if trade integration
leads to greater specialization in production, the scale of exchange rate adjustment that is
required to reallocate global expenditure across countries may actually increase.7 Reinforc-
ing this point, it is plausible that international ﬁnancial integration may actually promote
specialization in trade patterns, since the risks inherent in specialized production may be
partially diversiﬁed via global capital markets (Obstfeld 1994). Along another dimension,
if trade integration promotes international vertical integration in production and acceler-
ates international technological diﬀusion, it is also the case that it may reduce asymmetries
across countries and thereby weaken the incentives to run current account imbalances. In
view of this complex set of relations between trade and ﬁnancial integration, the joint study
of these diﬀerent dimensions of globalization is high at the top of the research agenda for
international macroeconomists.
In addition, major questions remain unanswered concerning the extent to which the
securities of diﬀerent nations have become close substitutes in global capital markets. Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a) ﬁnd some suggestive evidence that country risk premia in in-
terest rates remain signiﬁcant. At a policy level, the most important current issue is the
capacity of international investors to absorb ever-growing volumes of US liabilities. In par-
ticular, would private investors take up the slack if the Asian central banks revised their
strategy of accumulating large dollar reserves?
Related to this point, the possibility of a “sudden stop” in capital ﬂows to the US
cannot be discounted.8 In such an event, the world economy would have to adjust to a
6Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) document that trade costs remain very signiﬁcant: the costs involved
in transferring a good from the original producer to the ﬁnal consumer are on average 171 percent of the
producer price.
7See also Krugman (1990), Lane (2001) and Heathcote and Perri (2004).
8This term was coined by Calvo (1998) in reference to capital account crises in emerging market
economies. In fact, the ability of major ﬁnancial centres such as the US and the UK to issue highly-liquid
short-term liabilities means that they are particularly vulnerable to panic events. See also Kindleberger
7rapid closing of the US current account deﬁcit. As is quantiﬁed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2000, 2004), this would require a large exchange rate adjustment if a major recession is
to be avoided. The magnitude of the US real exchange rate depreciation could exceed 50
percent, depending on the extent of nominal rigidities and the degree of pass through from
exchange rates into consumer prices. Clearly, such a large relative price movement will be
the more disruptive, the less ﬂexible are ﬁrms and workers not only in the US but also in
its major trading partners in Europe, Asia and Latin America.
Finally, as was pointed out earlier, it is important to appreciate that net foreign asset dy-
namics depend not only on current account ﬂows but also on valuation eﬀects. For instance,
a country may run a current account deﬁcit and yet still experience an improvement in its
net international investment position if it enjoys sizeable capital gains on its foreign asset
holdings and/or inﬂicts capital losses on its foreign liabilities. As is highlighted by Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a) and Tille (2003) for the US, ﬁnancial globalization increases the
importance of the valuation channel by scaling up the gross size of international balance
sheets: for instance, a 10 percent capital gain on foreign asset holdings represents a larger
fraction of GDP, the larger is the ratio of gross foreign assets to output. In recent work,
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004a) show that the valuation channel represents an additional
mechanism by which exchange rates can play role in external adjustment, to the extent
that the asset and liability sides of the international balance sheet are asymmetrically af-
fected by a shift in the value of the exchange rate. Moreover, Gourinchas and Rey (2004)
make the intriguing ﬁnding that such valuation movements have been stabilizing in the US
case, with capital gains being timed to coincide with periods in which net foreign liabilities
have grown too large. As a general rule, however, it is unlikely that such a channel is
exploitable by policymakers, since investors would require a higher return if it is suspected
that policymakers might try to confer a capital levy on foreign creditors.
(1965) and Murray and Smithers (2000).
84 Conclusions
In this paper, I have emphasized that the pace of ﬁnancial globalization has been impressive
and is likely to continue. This is radically altering the global macroeconomic environment.
However, I have also suggested that behaviourial and informational barriers remain signif-
icant, such that we remain far from a idealized uniﬁed global capital market. In addition,
the macroeconomic implications of ﬁnancial globalization are quite sensitive to the extent
of real globalization: substantial convergence has taken place between the research agendas
of international trade economists and international macroeconomists.
Finally, I have reviewed the implications of ﬁnancial globalization for external adjust-
ment. With considerable fragmentation in product markets, the emergence of substantial
non-zero net foreign asset positions implies large shifts in real exchange rates over time.
Moreover, ﬁnancial panics cannot be ruled out if investors lose conﬁdence in a major debtor
nation: in such a situation, a reversal in capital ﬂows will not only require even larger ex-
change rate movements but also, in the absence of suﬃcient ﬂexibility, involve considerable
dislocation in production levels across countries.
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